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We give an introduction to the QBist interpretation of quantum mechanics. We
note that it removes the paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-problems that have
plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades. As an example, we show in
detail how it eliminates “quantum nonlocality”.
I. QBISM
In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the
phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the
manifold aspects of our experience.
— Niels Bohr, 19291
Physics is to be regarded not so much as the study of something a priori given,
but as the development of methods for ordering and surveying human experience.
— Niels Bohr, 19612
Much of what Bohr had to say about the nature of quantum physics evolved over a thirty
year span containing the 1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [EPR].3 But Bohr’s
view on the central role in science of human experience survived the trauma of EPR more
or less intact.
Although it differs in many important ways from what has come to be called “the Copen-
hagen interpretation”, QBism4 — Quantum Bayesianism — agrees with Bohr that the prim-
itive concept of experience is fundamental to an understanding of science. According to
QBism, quantum mechanics is a tool anyone can use to evaluate, on the basis of one’s past
experience, one’s probabilistic expectations for one’s subsequent experience.
Unlike Copenhagen, QBism explicitly takes the “subjective” or “judgmental” or “per-
sonalist” view of probability,5–9 which, though common among contemporary statisticians
and economists, is still rare among physicists: probabilities are assigned to an event by an
agent1 and are particular to that agent. The agent’s probability assignments express her own
1 “Agent” in the sense of one who acts (and not in the sense of one who represents another). We follow
the widespread practice in the quantum-information community of calling the agent Alice, and a second
agent she might have dealings with, Bob.
2personal degrees of belief about the event. The personal character of probability includes
cases in which the agent is certain about the event: even probabilities 0 and 1 are measures
of an agent’s (very strongly held) belief.
The subjective view returns probability theory to its historic origins in gambling. An
agent’s probabilities are defined by her willingness to place or accept any bets she believes
to be favorable to her on the basis of those probabilities. It is a striking, and, for most
physicists, surprising fact that all of the usual probability rules can be derived from just
one requirement, known as Dutch-book coherence: an agent’s probability assignments must
never place her in a position where she necessarily suffers a loss.6,10
These rules constrain the set of probabilities used by any single agent. It makes no
sense to impose Dutch-book coherence on a combination of probability assignments made
by more than one agent. In this sense probability is a “single-user theory”: probability
assignments express the beliefs of the agent who makes them, and refer to that same agent’s
expectations for her subsequent experiences. The term “single-user” does not, however,
mean that different users cannot each assign their own coherent probabilities.
A measurement in QBism is more than a procedure in a laboratory. It is any action an
agent takes to elicit a set of possible experiences. The measurement outcome is the par-
ticular experience of that agent elicited in this way. Given a measurement outcome, the
quantum formalism guides the agent in updating her probabilities for subsequent measure-
ments. QBism addresses John Bell’s complaint that physics should not be limited to the
outcomes of “piddling” laboratory tests,11 by allowing each of us to take the scope of physics
to be any of the manifold aspects of our own experience.
A measurement does not, as the term unfortunately suggests, reveal a pre-existing state
of affairs. It is an action on the world by an agent that results in the creation of an outcome
— a new experience for that agent. “Intervention” might be a better term,12 but after
more than 80 years of “measurement” the word is hard to purge from quantum theory.
Quantum states determine probabilities through the Born rule. Since probabilities are the
personal judgments of an agent, it follows that a quantum state assignment is also a personal
judgment of the agent assigning that state.13 The notorious “collapse of the wave-function”
is nothing but the updating of an agent’s state assignment on the basis of her experience.
Acting as an agent, Alice can use the formalism of quantum mechanics to model any
physical system external to herself. QBism directs her to treat all such external systems
on the same footing, whether they be atoms, enormous molecules, macroscopic crystals,
beam splitters, Stern-Gerlach magnets, or even agents other than Alice. In this respect,
QBism differs importantly from the Copenhagen interpretation as expounded by Landau
and Lifshitz. According to their quantum mechanics text14 “It is in principle impossible. . . to
formulate the basic concepts of quantum mechanics without using classical mechanics,” and
“By measurement, in quantum mechanics, we understand any process of interaction between
classical and quantum objects occurring apart from and independently of any observer.”
Landau and Lifshitz regard measurement and preparation devices as belonging to a separate
classical domain beyond the scope of quantum mechanics. Presumably they would treat
other agents as classical too, were they not explicitly excluded from consideration by the
last clause in the second quotation.
In QBism the only phenomenon accessible to Alice which she does not model with quan-
tum mechanics is her own direct internal awareness of her own private experience. This (and
only this) plays the role of the “classical objects” of Landau and Lifshitz for Alice (and only
for Alice). Her awareness of her past experience forms the basis for the beliefs on which her
3state assignments rest. And her probability assignments express her expectations for her
future experience.
The personal internal awareness of agents other than Alice of their own private experience
is, by its very nature, inaccessible to Alice, and therefore not something she can apply
quantum mechanics to. But verbal or written reports to Alice by other agents that attempt
to represent their private experiences are indeed part of Alice’s external world, and therefore
suitable for her applications of quantum mechanics. Having always stressed the crucial
importance of stating the results of experiments in ordinary language,15 Bohr would probably
have been comfortable with Alice’s indirect access to Bob’s experience, through language.
But Bohr would not have approved of Alice superposing reports from Bob about his own
experience, as QBism requires her to do if she wants to subject those reports to analysis
before they enter her own experience. We believe Bohr would have viewed Bob’s reports
— formulations in ordinary language — as beyond the scope of quantum mechanics. But
because Alice can treat Bob as an external physical system, according to QBism she can
assign him a quantum state that encodes her probabilities for the possible answers to any
question she puts to him. When Alice elicits an answer from Bob, she treats this as she
treats any other quantum measurement. Bob’s answer is created for Alice only when it
enters her experience. A QBist does not treat Alice’s interaction with Bob any differently
from, say, her interaction with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, or with an atom entering that
apparatus.
This means that reality differs from one agent to another. This is not as strange as it
may sound. What is real for an agent rests entirely on what that agent experiences, and
different agents have different experiences. An agent-dependent reality is constrained by the
fact that different agents can communicate their experience to each other, limited only by
the extent that personal experience can be expressed in ordinary language. Bob’s verbal
representation of his own experience can enter Alice’s, and vice-versa. In this way a common
body of reality can be constructed, limited only by the inability of language to represent the
full flavor — the “qualia” — of personal experience.
A QBist takes quantum mechanics to be a personal mode of thought — a very powerful
tool that any agent can use to organize her own experience. That each of us can use such
a tool to organize our own experience with spectacular success is an extremely important
objective fact about the world we live in. But quantum mechanics itself does not deal
directly with the objective world; it deals with the experiences of that objective world that
belong to whatever particular agent is making use of the quantum theory.
Given the unprecedented murkiness that has enveloped quantum foundations for the past
nine decades it is not surprising that an unorthodox approach is needed to dispel the fog.
But QBism is not all that radical. It just requires one to recognize and abandon a strongly
established way of thinking that served us reasonably well before we started to explore
realms at the atomic scale.
To illustrate how QBism illuminates quantum foundations, we use it in Sections II–V to
demonstrate that, contrary to the view of some physicists and many philosophers of science,
there is no clash between quantum mechanics and special relativity. “Quantum nonlocality”
is an artifact of inappropriate interpretations of quantum mechanics. The discussion in these
sections also brings out other important features of QBism.
Section VI expands on the strongly established way of thinking that QBism replaces.
4II. AGAINST NONLOCALITY
There is no nonlocality in quantum theory; there are only some nonlocal interpretations of
quantum mechanics. The most famous is Bohmian mechanics,16 whose nonlocality inspired
John Bell to show that nonlocality must be a feature of any interpretation that “completes”
quantum mechanics in the sense of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
But there are also local interpretations. Many people have pointed out that quantum
nonlocality cannot be demonstrated within the many-worlds interpretation.17–19 Robert Grif-
fiths has argued that quantum mechanics is local in the consistent-histories interpretation.20
Many of those who subscribe to some version of the Copenhagen interpretation are skeptical
about nonlocality, or reject it outright.21,22 QBism is also a local interpretation, but with a
rather different flavor.
Many Worlds and Consistent Histories work within quantum mechanics by extracting
their Weltanschauungen from formal mathematical features of the theory. In contrast to
these, and in contrast to Copenhagen, QBism makes sense of quantum mechanics by taking
an unfamiliar perspective on scientific theories and the scientists who use them. QBist
quantum mechanics is local because its entire purpose is to enable any single agent to
organize her own degrees of belief about the contents of her own personal experience. No
agent can move faster than light: the space-time trajectory of any agent is necessarily time-
like. Her personal experience takes place along that trajectory.
Therefore when any agent uses quantum mechanics to calculate “[cor]relations between
the manifold aspects of [her] experience”, those experiences cannot be space-like separated.
Quantum correlations, by their very nature, refer only to time-like separated events: the
acquisition of experiences by any single agent. Quantum mechanics, in the QBist interpre-
tation, cannot assign correlations, spooky or otherwise, to space-like separated events, since
they cannot be experienced by any single agent. Quantum mechanics is thus explicitly local
in the QBist interpretation.
And that’s all there is to it.
Why, then, do many people wrongly claim that quantum mechanics is nonlocal? They
do so by denying at least one of three fundamental precepts of QBism:
(1) A measurement outcome does not preexist the measurement. An outcome is created
for the agent who takes the measurement action only when it enters the experience of that
agent. The outcome of the measurement is that experience. Experiences do not exist prior
to being experienced.
(2) An agent’s assignment of probability 1 to an event expresses that agent’s personal
belief that the event is certain to happen. It does not imply the existence of an objective
mechanism that brings about the event. Even probability-1 judgments are judgments. They
are judgments in which the judging agent is supremely confident.
(3) Parameters that do not appear in the quantum theory and correspond to nothing
in the experience of any potential agent can play no role in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
We take up these points in the next three Sections.
5III. EXPERIENCES DO NOT EXIST PRIOR TO BEING EXPERIENCED
Unperformed experiments have no results.
— Asher Peres23
This experiment has no outcome until I experience one.
— Agent undertaking an experiment
QBism personalizes the famous dictum of Asher Peres. The outcome of an experiment
is the experience it elicits in an agent. If an agent experiences no outcome, then for that
agent there is no outcome. Experiments are not floating in the void, independent of human
agency. They are actions taken by an agent to elicit an outcome. And an outcome does not
become an outcome until it is experienced by the agent. That experience is the outcome.
This is illuminated by the famous “paradox” of Wigner and his friend. The friend makes
a measurement in a closed laboratory and experiences an outcome. Wigner, outside the
laboratory, doesn’t experience an outcome. If he believes what his friend has told him about
her plans in her laboratory he will assign an entangled state to her, her apparatus, and the
system on which she is making her intervention. Wigner’s state superposes all the possible
reports from his friend about her own experience, correlated with the corresponding readings
of her apparatus.
The disagreement between Wigner’s account and his friend’s is paradoxical only if you
take a measurement outcome to be an objective feature of the world, rather than the contents
of an agent’s experience. The paradox vanishes with the recognition that a measurement
outcome is personal to the experiencing agent. There is an outcome in the friend’s experi-
ence; there is none yet in Wigner’s. Of course their accounts differ. If Wigner goes on to ask
his friend about her experience, then the disagreement is resolved the moment he receives
her report, i.e. when it enters his own experience.
This is relevant to the usual nonlocality story, in which Alice and Bob agree on a particular
entangled state assignment to a pair of systems, one near Alice, the other near Bob. Each
then makes a measurement on their nearby system. In the usual story the outcomes are
implicitly assumed to come into existence at the site of each measurement at the moment
that measurement is performed.
What the usual story overlooks is that the coming into existence of a particular mea-
surement outcome is valid only for the agent experiencing that outcome. At the moment
of his own measurement Bob is playing the friend to Alice’s far-away Wigner, just as at
the moment of her own measurement she is playing the friend to Bob’s Wigner. Although
each of them experiences an outcome to their own measurement, they can experience an
outcome to the measurement undertaken by the other only when they receive the other’s
report. Each of them applies quantum mechanics in the only way in which it can be applied,
to account for the correlations in two measurement outcomes registered in his or her own
individual experience. And as noted above, experiences of a single agent are necessarily
time-like separated. The issue of nonlocality simply does not arise.
By reifying all measurement outcomes, without reference to the agent taking the action
or to that agent’s subsequent experience, the usual nonlocality arguments implicitly em-
brace the Copenhagen view that measurement outcomes belong to an objective (“classical”)
domain that is independent of agents and/or their experience. In QBism, however, an agent
applies quantum mechanics to everything outside her internal personal experience. There is
6a vestigial remnant in QBism of the Copenhagen classical domain, but the vestige of this
“classical domain” varies from one agent to another and is limited to that agent’s directly
perceived personal experience.
IV. PROBABILITY-1 ASSIGNMENTS ARE JUDGMENTS
The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the
Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time. . . , or Fairies and Witches, was an es-
sential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as
something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a mislead-
ing misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our actual
probabilistic beliefs.
— Bruno de Finetti6
Why, when an event appears to me as practically certain (i.e., when I evaluate
its probability as close to 1) have I the right to be practically certain that it will
occur? Because when I say that an event is practically certain (when I evaluate
its probability as close to 1) I do not say nor can I want to say more or less than
this: that I am practically certain it will occur.
— Bruno de Finetti25
When Alice assigns an event E probability 1, she is announcing her willingness to buy a
ticket that pays her a dollar if E happens, for any amount less than one dollar, and to sell
a ticket requiring her to pay a dollar if E happens, for any amount more than one dollar.2
It does not mean that there is an objective feature of the world that makes E happen.
That probability-1 (or probability-0) judgments are still judgments, like any other prob-
ability assignments, may be the hardest principle of QBism for physicists to accept. But it
belongs to a tradition going back at least to David Hume’s critique of induction. Why, just
because something has invariably happened in the past, can we infer that it will continue to
happen in the future? The only obvious answer — that this principle of inference has always
worked in the past — glaringly appeals to the very law of inference it has been invoked to
justify.
Inductive inference is nothing more than a broadly shared personal judgment based on
habit. The habit may even be hard-wired by evolution, but habit it remains. Should the
sun not rise tomorrow we would all have a lot of things to rethink, if we survived the
catastrophe. But appealing to the conservation of angular momentum as the objective
mechanism that guarantees future sunrises misses the point. The laws of classical mechanics
are themselves codifications of innumerable inductive inferences extracted from centuries of
human experience, and as such cannot explain the success of the inductive method. To be
sure, they are extraordinarily elegant and concise codifications, but to say that is also to
justify them in human terms. This may sound better than “habit”, but it is just as much a
subjective judgment.
The mistake in the 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen lies in their taking
probability-1 assignments to indicate objective features of the world, and not just firmly
2 If she assigns E a probability p, replace “one dollar” by “p dollars”.
7held beliefs. Their argument uses the famous EPR reality criterion: “If, without in any
way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to
unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity.” Without such “elements of physical reality”, there
is no basis for their argument that if quantum mechanics gives a complete description of
physical reality, then what is real in one place depends upon the process of measurement
carried out somewhere else.
Bohr maintained that EPR’s mistake lay in an “essential ambiguity” in their phrase
“without in any way disturbing”.26 But for a QBist their error is simpler. Their mistake
was their failure to understand, as many physicists today continue not to understand, that
p = 1 probability assignments are very firm personal judgments of the assigning agent, and
nothing more.
The unwarranted assumption that probability-1 judgments are necessarily backed up by
objective facts-on-the-ground — elements of physical reality — underlies EPR’s conclusion
that if quantum mechanics is complete then it must be (unacceptably to them) nonlocal. It
also underlies Bell’s original 1964 derivation of the Bell inequalities.27
There is, finally, a weaker kind of nonlocality argument that has a QBist refutation
different from those given above.
V. THE CONTENTS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE
In Sections II and III we noted that in QBism quantum correlations are necessarily
between time-like separated events, and therefore cannot be associated with faster-than-
light influences. This removes any tension between quantum mechanics and relativity.
“Quantum nonlocality” is, however, also invoked when one event is said to influence
another in the absence of any known connecting mechanism, whether or not the two events
are space-like separated. Space-like separation is relevant only to ensure the absence of an
unknown mechanism of influence, since whatever that influence might be, it would then
have to violate the relativistic prohibition on faster-than-light action. But a slower-than-
light influence can also be spooky, if it cannot be accounted for by any currently known
mechanism.
There are also no spooky slower-than-light influences in QBist quantum mechanics. As
Asher Peres liked to put it, nothing is propagated as a result of a measurement, neither
faster than light nor slower than a snail. Bob’s system is not changed by Alice’s far away
intervention in any way whatsoever.
The simplest such attempts to demonstrate this kind of “quantum nonlocality” involve
outcomes (not necessarily space-like separated) at detectors in two separate spatial regions
A and B (presided over by Alice and Bob).28 The outcomes are triggered by entities — call
them “particles” — that come to Alice and Bob from a common source S. Each detector can
be operated in two different settings, i = a or a′, and j = b or b′, and each when triggered
can produce one of two outcomes, x = −1 or 1 and y = −1 or 1. Alice and Bob agree on
the joint state they assign to the particles incident on their detectors, they agree on the
nature of those detectors, and therefore they both use quantum mechanics to calculate the
same probabilities p(x, y|i, j) for the outcomes each of them experience for each of the four
possible combinations of settings.
Bell inequalities are necessary conditions for these four joint probabilities all to be of the
8form
p(x, y|i, j) = 〈p(x, y|i, j, λ)〉, (1)
where p(x, y|i, j, λ) is of the form
p(x, y|i, j, λ) = p(x|i, λ)p(y|j, λ), (2)
and the brackets 〈 〉 in Eq. (1) denote a weighted average over a parameter or set of pa-
rameters λ. The nature of the parameters λ is rarely subject to much critical scrutiny.3
What is agreed is that the parameters and their weights are independent of the choice i, j of
Alice and Bob’s settings, and that conditioning on λ removes (“screen off ”) all correlations
between Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes x and y for all choices of the modes i and j that Alice
and Bob might select for their detectors, as indicated in Eq. (2).
If a set of distributions violates a Bell inequality, as many sets of quantum distributions
do, then there can be no such sets of parameters. What has the nonexistence of such
parameters to do with nonlocality? For a QBist the answer is “nothing!” because Eqs. (1)
and (2) are talking about nothing. The parameter λ is undefined. It does not appear in
the quantum theory. Nor has anybody ever suggested what in the experience of an agent λ
might correspond to. In QBism this puts it outside the scope of physical science.
What the parameter λ expresses is a classical intuition that correlations in the experiences
of agents in widely separated regions ought to find their explanation in correlations in
conditions prevailing in those regions. In particular when the local experiences are mediated
by the arrival of particles originating at a common source, λ is supposed to represent common
objective features of those particles imposed on them at that source. These features affect
the outcomes Alice and Bob experience. It is an important fact, surprising to one’s classical
intuition, that the correlations in Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes cannot be accounted for in this
way. But this does not mean that anything in Alice’s experience is influenced by Bob’s choice
of setting, or vice-versa. The variable λ is nothing more than a version of the discredited
EPR elements of reality. For a QBist the nonexistence of such objective facts-on-the-ground
as λ no more implies nonlocality than does the nonexistence of elements of reality in the
original EPR argument.
VI. CONCLUSION
One can only help oneself through something like the following emergency decree:
Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists – statements
about the object. Its statements deal only with the object-subject relation.
Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it evidently holds in
a much more radical and far reaching sense in quantum mechanics.
— Erwin Schro¨dinger, 1931 letter to Arnold Sommerfeld31
[Some] factors crucial to the perception of scientific work [are] . . . that the task
of science is described in full if we limit it to showing how, because of our unique
organization, the world must inevitably appear to us; that the eventual results
3 Examples of this can be found in recent papers by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph29 and Colbeck and
Renner30, along with much of the literature these papers have prompted.
9of science, precisely because of the manner of their acquisition, are conditioned
not only by our organization but also by what influenced that organization;
and lastly that the problem of a world constitution that takes no account of
the mental apparatus by which we perceive it is an empty abstraction, of no
practical interest.
— Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, 192732
Bohr was not the only one to articulate elements of a QBist position in the first third of
the 20th century. Two great Viennese investigators took such a view of science. The Future
of an Illusion is about the origin of religious belief, but Freud concludes his essay with a
thoroughly QBist characterization of our scientific understanding of the world. Schro¨dinger
explicitly takes a QBist view of quantum mechanics in his 1931 letter to Sommerfeld. Three
decades later, in Nature and the Greeks33, he takes a QBist view of science more generally
and hardly even mentions quantum mechanics. He stresses that because everything any of
us knows about the world is constructed out of his or her individual private experience, it
can be unwise to rely on a picture of the physical world from which personal experience
has been explicitly excluded, as it has been from physical science. Schro¨dinger traces this
exclusion back more than two thousand years to the ancient Greeks. It worked for over two
millennia and played an important role in the construction of classical science.
But when we attempted to understand phenomena at scales not directly accessible to
our senses, our ingrained practice of divorcing the objects of our investigations from the
subjective experiences they induce in us got us into trouble. While our efforts at dealing with
phenomena at these new scales were spectacularly successful, we have just as spectacularly
failed for almost a century to reach any agreement about the nature or meaning of that
success.
The Founders of quantum mechanics were already aware that there was a problem. Bohr
and Heisenberg dealt with it by emphasizing the inseparability of the phenomena from the
instruments we devised to investigate them. Instruments are the Copenhagen surrogate for
experience. Being objective and independent of the agent using them, instruments miss the
central point of QBism, giving rise to the notorious measurement problem, which has vexed
physicists to this day.
Bohr seems closer to QBism in the two quotations at the head of Section I. But we
suspect that, if pressed to explain “experience”, he would have fallen back on our experience
of a classical apparatus. Unlike a QBist he would not give the term enough scope — any
and all experience — or the appropriately personalistic primacy: any user’s own experience
constitutes all of the raw material out of which she constructs her world.
The subsequent view of Heisenberg34 and Rudolph Peierls35, that quantum physics was
not about the world, but about our “knowledge” of the world, gets even closer to the real
issue. But it raises tough questions. Whose knowledge? Knowledge about what? The
trouble is that “knowledge” is the wrong term, for two reasons.
First, it is wrong because generally there are many different agents. Anybody using
quantum mechanics to organize her experience can be an agent, and different agents have
different experiences. “Knowledge” can suggest an agent-independent factuality. “Belief ”,
which unavoidably implies a believer, is more balanced between subject and object.
Second, “knowledge” is the wrong word because the fundamental output of the quantum
theory is not a set of facts, but a set of probabilities. The probabilities in quantum mechanics,
like all probabilities, express the willingness of the agent using them to take or place bets.
That willingness is based on personal judgment, informed by the agent’s beliefs.
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We have noted that the QBist position, that quantum states are personal judgments of
an agent, is an inevitable consequence of the subjective view of probability expressed so
eloquently by Bruno de Finetti. On the other hand, given its ability to remove the long-
standing paradoxes and absurdities that have plagued quantum foundations for almost a
century, one could invert the argument and maintain that QBism provides a powerful vali-
dation of the personalist view of probability. The troubled history of quantum foundations
is a telling indictment of the proposition that probabilities, even including probabilities 1
and 0, are not personal judgments but facts, backed up by objective features of the world.
Among those absurdities is “quantum nonlocality”. We have been told that QBism is
“too great a price to pay” to restore locality to physics. But a prejudice against nonlocality
is not the reason for embracing QBism. The recognition that science has a subject as well as
an object liberates us from the grip of an ancient Greek maneuver that worked for over two
millennia, until it tripped us up in the last century. Restoring the subject-object balance
clears up the obscurities and ambiguities of the Copenhagen interpretation, eliminates the
measurement problem, and — incidentally — invalidates the claim that quantum mechanics
is nonlocal, or in conflict, or just in a state of tension, with special relativity.
We bring QBism to the reader’s attention because it corrects a profound misconception
in our general view of science, which led us into major confusion in the 20th century. Now
that we are well into the 21st and we all agree that quantum mechanics works spectacularly
well for every practical purpose, surely it is time to expand our ancient view of the nature
of science, to dispel the murkiness that has obscured the foundations of the theory for too
long.
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